A parlous impasse

Six months after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the battle appears to have reached a treacherous impasse, with no obvious frontrunner. The Russian attack’s first stage, a rapid strike intended at taking Kyiv and disemboweling the Ukrainian leadership, was a fast and humiliating failure. Due to stiff Ukrainian opposition, the Russians were forced to retreat to the country’s east, where their goals were limited in the near run to the annexation of the Donbas area. The two sides have been involved in an artillery war in the Donbas assault, which began in late April, with less quick troop advances and more blasting shells and rockets from afar. This played to Russia’s core strength, a numerically superior howitzer corps, and resulted in massive Ukrainian fatalities and gradual but steady Russian successes throughout the spring and early summer.

However, whether this implies Ukraine is now winning is a more difficult subject to determine. We don’t know if the impending counteroffensive will be successful; it will be determined by aspects for which we have limited data, such as Ukraine’s capacity to perform so-called combined weapons offensive operations. The larger strategic picture is less murky – but only somewhat. On one level, it’s been obvious since Russia’s failure to seize Kyiv that Russia was doomed. Nothing less than proficiently taking hold of the Ukrainian state could explain Russia’s military, economic, and international reputational damage. Russia’s invasion has already flopped, and its remaining fighting efforts are focused on making the most of a bad situation – achieving enough advances to sell the war to its citizens and the rest of the world. However, just because the war has been catastrophic for Russia does not mean that Ukraine has triumphed. Since the conflict began, the invading nation has sustained significant losses; Russia presently occupies a wide swath of its east and south. Improving its postwar condition will very definitely need more fighting successes, which would force Russia to give up many of its advantages at the bargaining table.

Territorial gains and losses can sometimes be used to estimate battle progress. Territorial changes are often a lagging signal rather than a leading indicator in artillery battles such as the current combat in the Donbas. It’s difficult for any side to make major progress as long as both sides can keep up the onslaught. In an attrition battle, armies are steadily degraded yet may abruptly lose control because they are finally put in an unsustainable situation. Russia has taken the initiative throughout the majority of the conflict. Following the invasion by Moscow, Ukraine was compelled to wage a valiant defence of its major cities, notably the capital Kyiv. Even though this attack was unsuccessful, Russia was nonetheless able to dictate the terms of the subsequent phase of the conflict by launching a fresh offensive in the Donbas area, which forced an unprepared Ukrainian defence.

Ukraine has recently attacked Russian trains, infrastructure, and munitions storage facilities with its artillery weapons. Truck convoys have been heavily utilised by the Russians to transport supplies to the front, however they are less effective and simple targets for the Ukrainians after being unloaded. Ukraine has also shown that it is capable of striking far into Russian-controlled territory. Ukrainian aircraft and partisans have been attacking military installations in Crimea, the southern Ukrainian archipelago that Russia annexed in 2014, including an airport and the command centre of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, since the beginning of August. There seems to be a chance for Ukraine to unleash its own counter – attack in an effort to recapture strategically important territory by leveraging on Russia’s vulnerability.

Battlefield successes in conflict are a tool for achieving certain political objectives rather than an end in themselves. Sometimes there is a clear connection between military goals and political goals. One side totally destroys the other, taking control of their land or compel them to unconditionally surrender. This concept is applicable to some of the most well-known wars in history, such as the American Civil War and World War II. However, rather than being common, these conflicts are the exception.

The unceasing conflict in Ukraine is not expected to deviate from the pattern. It is now obvious that a complete Russian triumph, including the conquest of Ukraine, is not possible. The maximalist goal of Ukraine, to completely drive Russian soldiers from its internationally recognised boundaries, does not now seem to be within reach. Therefore, it is quite likely that this conflict will be settled through negotiations. Any form of negotiated agreement appears quite remote at this time. Early on in the fight, peace talks were attempted but failed. Despite the fact that these talks did result in a few minor accords between the two nations, the leaders of both sides still feel confident that they can win the war. It is quite impossible to predict the details of a peace agreement, much less whether it would be more advantageous to one side or the other, as long as this urge to fight persists. However, one broad conclusion is clearly obvious: This conflict is a strategic failure for Russia. Russia’s early war objectives were manifestly unsuccessful. However, it does not mean that Ukraine has won the battle if Russia has lost in that most fundamental sense. The war has lost its main objective and is being driven by forces of altruism.